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1. Introduction 
The European Union has a wide spectrum of legal instruments 
addressing various aspects of cybersecurity, ranging from electronic 
communication laws, data protection regulations through network and 
information security legislation to instruments dealing with 
cybercrime and recommendations on coordinated response to large 
scale cyber incidents – all this without having a commonly accepted 
definition of cybersecurity.  
The 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy describes cybersecurity in general 
terms in a footnote as the “safeguards and actions that can be used to 
protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from 
those threats that are associated with or that may harm its 
interdependent networks and information infrastructure”. 1  The 
proposed Cybersecurity Act purports to define cybersecurity as it 
“comprises all activities necessary to protect network and information 
 
1  European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace,” 7 February, 2013. 
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systems, their users, and affected persons from cyber threats”, 2 
however the definition is not explained in available preparatory 
documents, although the word cybersecurity is used 462 times in the 
impact assessment.3 According to these existing wordings, which are 
overly broad, cybersecurity is a process or activity. Other instruments, 
such as the 2017 Communication on Resilience, Deterrence and 
Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU4, also refer to 
cybersecurity as it was an attribute or a desired state to be achieved. 
The lack of clarity about this core concept raises questions about 
coherence and consistency of already adopted and newly proposed 
legislative acts in the field of cybersecurity. Precisely what harms EU 
cybersecurity-related laws seek to prevent? Understanding the harms 
is essential to prioritizing goals, limits and scope of the relevant legal 
framework.  
Therefore, we propose to take a step back and examine the subjects, 
methods and reasons behind relevant EU regulatory acts in order to 
determine the scope and goals of EU laws that aim to promote 
cybersecurity. It is also expected that “EU cybersecurity law” as a 
legal framework is constrained by the competences of the EU, as well 
as by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, hence will 
necessarily differ from that of a federal state or that of a Member 
State. Conceptualizing EU cybersecurity law will also allow to 
examine how lawmakers can improve the legal framework for 
 
2  COM (2017) 477: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on ENISA, the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 
526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity 
certification (”Cybersecurity Act”). 
3  See Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment. Accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on ENISA, the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 
526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity 
certification (”Cybersecurit. Act”), SWD/2017/0500 final – 2017/0225 (COD); 
opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, SEC/2017/0389 final. Online at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=pi_com:SEC(2017)389).  
4  Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Resilience, 
Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU, JOIN/2017/0450 
final. 
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cybersecurity and contribute to the stated need (by ENISA, 2012) to 
define common cybersecurity goals across the EU. In order to 
illustrate the challenges, we examine a high-profile cyber-attack (i.e. 
Wannacry ransomware 2017) to gain a fuller picture of the harms 
caused in or to Europe. 
2.  Wannacry crisis in the EU 
2.1  The attack 
Digital transformation, which is brought about by the rapid pace in 
technological change, challenges the regulatory framework of EU 
Member States’ institutions, their private businesses and the EU as a 
whole.5 Prior to forming a broad concept of “EU cybersecurity law“, 
it is of utmost importance to scrutinize the severe impact a malicious 
cyber-attack can cause on different stakeholders.  
To this end, we choose to study the large-scale cyber-attack 
“Wannacry“, which “brought the issue of cyber resilience into the 
mainstream of public and political discourse“, and we use it to shed 
some light upon what EU cybersecurity laws are about.6  
On 13th May, 2017, the last business day of the week, a message 
reading “Oops, your files have been encrypted” appeared on more 
than 200.000 computer screens throughout the world demanding a 
ransom of between $ 300 and $ 600 being paid in Bitcoin in exchange 
 
5  Maria Solarte-Vasquez and Katrin Nyman Metcalf, “Smart Contracting: A 
Multidisciplinary and Proactive Approach for the EU Digital Single Market”, Baltic 
Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2017), p. 218.  
6  Julian King, “Commissioner King’s keynote speech at the, ‘WannaCry again? 
Making our businesses digitally great and cyberproof’ conference”, 15 February, 
2018. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/king/ 
announcements/commissioner-kings-keynote-speech-wannacry-again-making-our-
businesses-digitally-great-and_en. “Last year, the WannaCry malware did not just 
cause computers to freeze, but hospitals to close. It brought the issue of cyber 
resilience into the mainstream of public and political discourse.” 
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for decrypting files stored on compromised devices.7 Various major 
businesses in the European Union as the French carmaker Renault, 
the German transport company DB, or Spain’s telecommunications 
operator Telefónica felt victim to the ransomware attack, which these 
companies could have avoided had they followed Microsoft’s advise 
in March to close a vulnerable loophole in the Windows operating 
system by updating their computer software.8  One of the gravest 
consequences of the disruptive attack was witnessed by the British 
National Health Service (NHS), where 80, or one third of all NHS 
trusts and 595 general practises were forced to cancel almost 19000 
appointments, hundreds of surgeries and even cancer referrals. 9 
Wannacry did not hold back from spreading to devices in critical 
infrastructure, disrupting information systems, which store laboratory 
data and radiographs.10  
The malware had two components. The first, called EternalBlue, a 
tool exploiting a vulnerability in Windows operating systems 
enabling the worm to reach other computers without the end user’s 
 
7  Russell Goldman, “What We Know and Don’t Know About the International 
Cyberattack,” The New York Times, 12 May, 2017. Online at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/international-cyberattack-
ransomware.html; see also: Chris Graham, “NHS cyber attack: Everything you need 
to know about ‘biggest ransomware’ offensive in history,” The Telegraph, 20 May 
2017. Online at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/nhs-cyber-attack-
everything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/. 
8  Sam Jones, “Timeline: How the WannaCry cyber attack spread,” FT, 14 May, 2017. 
Online at: https://www.ft.com/content/82b01aca-38b7-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23; 
consider also: Handelsblatt, “Cyberangriff legt 450 Bahn-Computer lahm,”, 16 May 
2017. Online at: https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/handel-konsumgueter/ 
wanna-cry-cyberangriff-legt-450-bahn-computer-lahm/19809190.html?ticket=ST-
2221470-N9RWTH0YgdtJ5A3foRbK-ap2); see further: Michael Schilliger, “Elf 
Antworten zur Cyberattacke ‘WannaCry’,” NZZ, 13 May, 2017. Online at: 
https://www.nzz.ch/digital/globaler-cyberangriff-sieben-antworten-zur-cyberattacke 
-wanacrypt-20-ld.1292982). 
9  National Audit Office, Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS, 25 April, 
2018. Online at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-
WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf; see further: Graham, supra note 7; see 
also: BBC, “NHS ‘could have prevented’ WannaCry ransomware attack,” 27 
October, 2017. Online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41753022. 
10  Schilliger, supra note 8.  
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permission through channels created to transmit and share data.11 As 
soon as a recipient opened an enclosed file in an email, which 
contained the malicious programme, the malware started spreading at 
an unprecedented speed to other Windows systems linked to the 
infected computer.12 The second element pertains to the encryption of 
the files stored on the computer, locking down data and systems. A 
message box popped up on the screen demanding the user to pay in 
cryptocurrency to restore the accessibility of one’s data.13  
It is worthwhile mentioning that the disruptive component of 
Wannacry, EternalBlue, was initially written by the N.S.A. to take 
advantage of Windows’s vulnerability for spying activities on 
companies and foreign intelligence services.14 One month prior to the 
 
11  Qian Chen & Robert Bridges, “Automated Behavioral Analysis of Malware: A Case 
Study of WannaCry Ransomware,” Conference Paper (2017), at 2: “The dropper of 
the malware carries two components. One uses the “EternalBlue” exploit against a 
vulnerability of Windows’ Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to propagate, and 
the other is a WannaCry ransomware encryption component.”; see further: Liliy Hay 
Newan, “The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned About Is Here,” Wired, 5 
December, 2017. Online at: https://www.wired.com/2017/05/ransomware-
meltdown-experts-warned/ “Once WannaCry enters a network, it can spread around 
to other computers on that same network, a typical trait of ransomware that 
maximizes the damage to companies and institutions.”. 
12  Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries Exploiting 
Stolen N.S.A. Tool,” The New York Times, 12 May, 2017. Online at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-
cyberattack.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news: “The 
malware was circulated by email. Targets were sent an encrypted, compressed file 
that, once loaded, allowed the ransomware to infiltrate its targets. The fact that the 
files were encrypted ensured that the ransomware would not be detected by security 
systems until employees opened them, inadvertently allowing the ransomware to 
replicate across their employers’ networks.”; see also: Graham, supra note 7: 
“Hackers have been spreading “ransomware” called WannaCry, also known as 
WanaCrypt0r 2.0, WannaCry and WCry. It is often delivered via emails which trick 
the recipient into opening attachments and releasing malware onto their system in a 
technique known as phishing”. 
13  See e.g.: Goldman, supra note 7.  
14  Schillinger, supra note 8; see also: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
“The WannaCry ransomware attack,” Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 4 (2017), at 
vii-viii.  
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attack, this crucial element of the code turned out to have fallen into 
the hands of a cyber criminal group, known as “Shadow Brokers“ who 
leaked it to the public on their webpage in April.15 Various actors, 
there under Microsoft, heavily criticised the N.S.A. and some even 
claimed that it should incur responsibility for the cyber-attack.16  
2.2  Response and impact 
Amid the outbreak of the virus, Microsoft provided an emergency 
patch to Windows XP, Windows 2003 and Windows 8 users that 
helped prevent the malware from spreading further.17 Additionally, 
 
15  The International Institute for Strategic Studies, supra note 14; consider also: Andy 
Greenberg, “Hold North Korea Accountable for Wannacry – and the NSA, too,” 
Wired, 19 December, 2017. Online at: https://www.wired.com/story/korea-
accountable-wannacry-nsa-eternal-blue/: “WannaCry's origins stretch back to April, 
when a group of mysterious hackers calling themselves the Shadow Brokers publicly 
released a trove of stolen NSA code. The tools included an until-then-secret hacking 
technique known as EternalBlue, which exploits flaws in a Windows protocol known 
as Server Message Block to remotely take over any vulnerable computer”. 
16  Brad Smith, “The need for urgent collective action to keep people safe online: 
Lessons from last week’s cyberattack,” The Al Blog, 14 May, 2017. Online at: 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-collective-action 
-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/sm.001p0mwmqc3  ld351 
07z1pj4ntjs26: “{E}xploits in the hands of governments have leaked into the public 
domain and caused widespread damage. An equivalent scenario with conventional 
weapons would be the U.S. military having some of its Tomahawk missiles stolen. 
And this most recent attack represents a completely unintended but disconcerting link 
between the two most serious forms of cybersecurity threats in the world today – 
nation-state action and organized criminal action.”; see also: Greenberg, supra note 
15; see further: Ellen Nakashima and Craig Timberg, “NSA officials worried about 
the day its potent hacking tool would get loose. Then it did.,” The Washington Post, 
16 May, 2017. Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ business 
/technology/nsa-officials-worried-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-
loose-then-it-did/2017/05/16/50670b16-3978-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story. 
html? noredirect=on&utm_term=.ececf4d96f19. 
17  Mark Scott and Nick Wingfield, “Hacking Attack Has Security Experts Scrambling 
to Contain Fallout,” The New York Times, 13 May, 2017. Online at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/world/asia/cyberattacks-online-security-
.html: “Microsoft took the unusual step of releasing free security patches for older 
versions of Windows, including Windows XP, that it no longer routinely updates. It 
said the patches could help protect users from attacks, which have not targeted 
Windows 10, the latest edition of the software.” Greenberg, supra note 15.  
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by coincidence a security analyst from the UK found a ‘’kill switch“ 
in the code, which he activated by purchasing a web address the 
ransomware inquired.18  The attack subsided significantly after a few 
days, but the vulnerability in the systems remained for those 
computers that had still not been updated since the hackers could 
easily rewrite the code and infect other systems without a kill-switch 
implanted. It was also for this reason the European Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3), Europol, distributed awareness materials on social media 
platforms and created an information webpage outlining key 
strategies on how to protect private data from malware attacks.19 In 
addition, it referred to the NoMoreRansom initiative, which primarily 
informs and dissuades consumers affected by ransomware from 
financing cybercrime activities.20 The majority of large corporations 
did not give in to the demands of the cyber criminals and spend most 
resources on either rebuilding or restoring data from backups.21 
The cyber-assault has been attributed to the State sponsored North 
Korean cybercrime group called “Lazarus” and affected thousands of 
 
18  Jones, supra note 8: “Security analysts stress it could have been worse but for the 
actions of an anonymous British security researcher. After lunch on Friday, a 22-
year-old cyber analyst, who writes online under the pseudonym MalwareTech, 
returned to his desk and spotted something crucial in WannaCry’s code — the first 
stage of its infection process. The obscure web address the ransomware was 
querying, he noticed, was unregistered and inactive. So he bought it for $11 and 
activated it. It turned out to be a form of “kill switch” baked into WannaCry by its 
creators. Activating the address told the ransomware, upon each new infection, not 
to proceed any further. Once he had control of it, WannaCry was stopped in its 
tracks”. 
19  Europol, “How does the WannaCry ransomware work?,” 4 December, 2018. Online 
at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/wannacry-ransomware); see also: General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Cybersecurity – Information from 
the Commission, 9621/17, 31 May, 2017, at 2: “In the context of the public response 
to the WannaCry attack, Europol (via its European Cybercrime Centre [EC3]) created 
a dedicated information page 3 and disseminated flyers and awareness  materials via 
Europol social media channels”.  
20  General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, supra note 19, at 2.  
21  Jonathan Beer, “WannaCry” ransomware attack losses could reach $4 billion,” 
CBSNews, 16 May, 2017. Online at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-
ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/: “Most of the organizations won’t pay 
{…} “They will rebuild and recover from their backups or other sources.”  
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companies and public services worldwide.22 In an interview with the 
German news service “Tagesscha” the head of Europol, Steven 
Wilson, described the events as the “largest cyber-attack the world 
witnessed so far“ taking a great toll on the economy.23 In the same 
vein, leading IT experts as Mikko Hyppönen spoke of the “largest 
ransomware-epidemic in history“.24 Ransomware attacks were not a 
new phenomenon in 2017. The magnitude of Wannacry, however, 
was “unprecedented” with over 230.000 computers in 150 countries 
being targeted in total. 25  It was not without reason why also the 
director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation, Rob Wainright, classified the virus as a novel type of 
malicious attack.26  
Considering the EU’s efforts on strengthening stability of cyberspace 
through international cooperation, one month after Wannacry 
unfolded, the Council of the European Union approved the “Draft 
Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic 
 
22  BBC, “Cyber-attack: US and UK blame North Korea for WannaCry,” 19 December, 
2017. Online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42407488; see also: 
Reuters, “Britain believes North Korea was behind ‘WannaCry’ NHS cyber attack,” 
27 October 2017. Online at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-
northkorea/britain-believes-north-korea-was-behind-wannacry-nhs-cyber-attack-
idUKKBN1CW153. 
23  Tagesschau, “Europol zu WannaCry: Das ist der größte Cyberangriff bisher,“ 17 
May, 2017. Online at: https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europol-wannacry-
101.html.  
24  Spiegel Online, “WannaCry“ – Attacke – Fakten zum globalen Cyberangriff,” 13 
May, 2017. Online at: http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/wannacry-attacke-
fakten-zum-globalen-cyber-angriff-a-1147523.html. 
25  Europol, supra note 19: “The recent attack is at an unprecedented level and requires 
a complex international investigation to respond effectively and identify the 
culprits.” Consider also: Julian King, “Commissioner King’s speech at the EU 
Cybersecurity Conference Digital Single Market, Common Digital Security 2017,” 
15 September, 2017. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
commissioners/2014-2019/king/announcements/commissioner-kings-speech-eu-
cybersecurity-conference-digital-single-market-common-digital-security_en. 
26  CBS, supra note 21: “There is no precedent for a ransomware attack of this kind of 
scale,” {…}. This is the first one that we have seen … that has been able to attack 
computers directly with this kind of success.” 
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Response to Malicious Cyber Activities”, the so-called “Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox”.27 With this initiative, the EU member states 
reiterated that cyber-attacks do not occur in a legal vacuum and agreed 
that the EU will respond with restrictive measures against individuals 
affiliated with cybercriminal gangs or even against states which 
promote such malicious activities by providing either sanctuary for 
them or hire them for   political purposes.28  
As stated by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the 
Wannacry ransomware attack triggered cooperation between Member 
States within the framework of the NIS directive.29 For the first time 
since its adoption, the affected EU countries exchanged intelligence 
on a cyber-attack on this legal basis.30 In the State of the Union 
Address in 2017, the president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, mentioned cyber security as the EU’s fourth policy priority 
of the subsequent year.31 In summer 2018, the Council of the EU 
 
27  Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a 
Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy 
Toolbox”) – Adoption, 7923/2/17 REV 2, 7 June 2017.  
28  Ibid: “The EU affirms that malicious cyber activities might constitute wrongful acts 
under international law and emphasises that States should not conduct or knowingly 
support ICT activities contrary to their obligations under international law, and 
should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful 
acts using ICTs, as it is stated in the 2015 report of the United Nations Groups of 
Governmental Experts (UN GGE). {...}. The EU affirms that measures within the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, including, if necessary, restrictive measures, 
adopted under the relevant provisions of the Treaties, are suitable for a Framework 
for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities and should encourage 
cooperation, facilitate mitigation of immediate and long-term threats, and influence 
the behavior of potential aggressors in a long term.” 
29  General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, supra note 19: “The recent 
WannaCry cyberattack where a wave of ransomware attacks impacted organizations 
and citizens across the globe was the first time where Member States exchanged 
information on cybersecurity incident within the mechanism for operational 
cooperation under the NIS Directive, the so-called Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams network. This is yet another real-life example that proves how 
important cooperation in the area of cybersecurity is.” 
30  Ibid.  
31  Jean-Claude Juncker, “Fourth priority for the year ahead: I want us to better protect 
Europeans in the digital age.” Online at: http://europa/eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. 
Agnes Kasper / Alexander Antonov  
10 
 
recalled the Commission’s 2017 recommendation on creating a 
“Coordinated Response to Large-scale Cybersecurity Incidents and 
Crises“ and underlined, inter alia, that EU Member States “need to 
make use of the existing crisis management mechanisms, processes 
and procedures at national and European level”.32 
Debating malicious cyber activities in the EU, eleven months after the 
attack, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU “condemn{ed} the 
malicious use of information and communications technologies 
(ICT), including in Wannacr” and “stresse{“ that cyber-attacks 
“undermin” the EU’s “stability, security and the benefits provided by 
the internet and the use of ICT”.33  
Considering the harms caused by Wannacry, even though none was 
injured or killed nor data had been stolen in the attack, (1) the 
economic damage was significant.34 Whereas Cyence Risk Analytics 
estimated the costs at $ 4 billion, others predicted a loss of hundreds 
of millions of dollars. 35  (2) Not only did the assault temporarily 
hamper the companies’ productivity, (3) but it also worsened their 
business reputation. Looking at the case of the NHS, the British public 
was seriously concerned about its national health service and 
questioned its failure to keep up with modern cybersecurity 
standard.36 The image of the NHS suffered further when the UK 
 
32  General Secretariat of the Council, supra note 19, at 2-3.  
33  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on malicious cyber activities – 
approval, 7517/18, 16 April 2018: “The EU firmly condemns the malicious use of 
information and communications technologies (ICTs), including in Wannacry and 
NotPetya, which have caused significant damage and economic loss in the EU and 
beyond. Such incidents are destabilizing cyberspace as well as the physical world as 
they can be easily misperceived and could trigger cascading events. The EU stresses 
that the use of ICTs for malicious purposes is unacceptable as it undermines our 
stability, security and the benefits provided by the Internet and the use of ICTs.” 
34  Suzanne Barlyn, “Global cyber attack could spur $53 billion in losses: Lloyd’s of 
London,” Reuters, 17 July 2017. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cyber-lloyds-report-idUSKBN1A20AB.  
35  Beer, supra note 21: “Cyber risk modeling firm Cyence estimates the potential costs 
from the hack at $4 billion, while other groups predict losses would be in the 
hundreds of millions.” 
36  Graham, supra note 7; see also: BBC, supra note 22.  
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Department of Health and Social Care made public that Wannacry 
resulted in a loss of £ 92 million in British taxpayers money.37 (4) 
Decreased public confidence into e-services, which many EU-citizens 
rely on in their everyday-life38, and into the security of computer 
systems in general, that store vast amount of sensible private data of 
millions of clients and patients, constituted additional harms. (5) 
Taking a broader view on the effects of the attack, it can be said that 
cyberspace and the physical world in general was destabilized. (6) 
Critical infrastructures were affected in the EU, which is concern for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Member States. 
Despite the Commission’s multidimensional approach in improving 
the EU member states’ cyber resilience, there is no commonly 
accepted definition of cybersecurity in the EU, leaving each of the EU 
governments room for different interpretation of this increasingly 
important legal area. Juncker’s statement that cyber threats could 
destabilize the economy of democracies more effectively than ‘’guns 
and tanks“ given the speed and virulence malware spread with, serves 
as further proof for the need to formulate the idea of EU cybersecurity 
law.39 With European cybersecurity being challenged every day, the 
EU’s goal to harmonize national law systems of member states in 
regard to cyber security and therefore increase the EU’s resilience 
against cyber-attacks can be better attained if the affected states 
identified the multifarious harmful effects on their economy and 
society. With six main harms caused by Wannacry being established, 
the subsequent chapters set out the core elements of EU cybersecurity 
law.  
 
37  Matthew Field, “WannaCry cyber attack cost the NHS £92m as 19.000 appointments 
cancelled,” The Telegraph, 11 October 2018. Online at: https://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/technology/2018/10/11/wannacry-cyber-attack-cost-nhs-92m-19000-
appointments-cancelled/. 
38  Tanel Kerikmäe (ed.), Regulating eTechnologies in the European Union: Normative 
Realities and Trends, 2014, p. 1.  
39  Jean-Claude Juncker, supra note 31: “Cyber-attacks can be more dangerous to the 
stability of democracies and economies than guns and tanks{…} Cyber attacks know 
no borders and no one is immune”. 
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3.  Cybersecurity: lost in translation? 
3.1  Lack of consistent terminology 
The cybersecurity field in general uses many concepts from 
neighbouring domains, but it has been infiltrated with terms from 
political science as well.40  Cybersecurity is not synonymous with 
security of network and information systems, although for the last few 
years there has been some confusion for a good reason, which was 
also pointed out in a recommendation by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA): Member States should 
“[a]gree on a commonly accepted working definition of cyber 
security that is precise enough to support the definition of common 
goals across the EU”.41 Cybersecurity remains a field where different 
perceptions and narratives determine its content for the respective 
actor, in particular that EU Member States emphasize certain aspects 
of cybersecurity in their strategic and policy documents, while 
downplaying others. 42  Terminology used in international forums, 
such as the UN, where discussion is held about ‘information security’ 
(although certainly deals with issues above the micro-level), reflects 
on the lack of coherent conceptual framework in this field.43  
 
 
40  For example it is customary to label some hacker groups as ‘Advanced Persistent 
Threat’ or APT, in addition to giving them descriptive fantasy names, such as APT29 
or Cozy Bear – a Russian hacker group believed to be associated with Russian 
intelligence.  
41  ENISA, National Cyber Security Strategies – Setting the course for national efforts 
to strengthen security in cyberspace, 2012. p. 12. Online at: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber-security-strategies-paper)  
42  See the different national concepts in the cybersecurity strategies of EU Member 
States, collected at ENISA website. Online at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map. 
43  The UK in its 2017 Response to General Assembly resolution 71/28 “Developments 
in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security” stated that “The United Kingdom uses its preferred terminology of 
‘cybersecurity’ and related concepts throughout its response, to avoid confusion 
given the different interpretations of the term ‘information security’ in this context.” 
Online at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.  
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The difference between data security and network and information 
security44 also needs to be emphasized, since although data security 
is a vital component of cybersecurity, for instance the Wannacry 
attack compromised more than just the availability of data and 
affected European critical infrastructure operators in the health, 
energy, transport, finance and telecom sectors, manufacturers and 
service providers throughout Europe.45 Data and information is held 
in systems and transmitted through networks, which are increasingly 
relied on for everyday services, in particular when put into the context 
of Internet of Things era, where billions of appliances are connected 
to the internet. Focusing on information and data security, as well as 
systems and network security ensures that threats to cyber-physical 
systems, such as smart grids, autonomous automobiles, medical 
monitoring, industrial control systems, robotic surgery systems, etc.  
are also addressed. In turn, this enables regulators to link security 
compromises of systems and networks to their consequences, such as 
potential physical injuries or property damages.  
A working definition of cybersecurity has been used in the 2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, which in footnote no. 
4 states that “Cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and 
actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the 
civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with 
or that may harm its interdependent networks and information 
infrastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and 
 
44  The ISO/IEC 27000: 2017 standard defines information security as the ‘preservation 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information’. ISO/IEC 27032:2018 
refers to network security as it ‘is concerned with the design, implementation and 
operation of networks for achieving the purposes of information security on networks 
within organizations, between organizations, and between organizations and users’. 
ISO/IEC 27032:2018 defines cyberspace security as ‘Preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in Cyberspace’, and it emphasizes that 
cybersecurity is not synonymous with information, network, internet security or 
critical information infrastructure protection.  
45  ENISA, WannaCry Ransomware: First ever case of cyber cooperation at EU level, 
15 May, 2017. Online at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/wannacry-
ransomware-first-ever-case-of-cyber-cooperation-at-eu-level. 
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integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of 
the information contained therein.” 46  The High Level Scientific 
Advisors on cybersecurity in the European digital single market has 
also added the same definition to their glossary, but felt that this needs 
to be complemented by a reference to “prevention and law 
enforcement measures to fight cybercrime”.47  
These approaches made little distinction between the technically 
oriented concepts, such as network and information security, and the 
emerging understanding seems to be that cybersecurity addresses 
concerns beyond the micro level of organizations and businesses. 
ENISA has also concluded that “[c]ybersecurity is an enveloping term 
and it is not possible to make a definition to cover the extent of the 
things Cybersecurity covers”, however contextual definitions are 
already in use.48 Therefore, we do not aim to define cybersecurity in 
this paper, but we work with existing understandings, in order to put 
cybersecurity into context for the legal community. 
3.2 Cyberspace elements - what needs to be secured? 
In order to unlock the concept of cybersecurity law, we need to find 
the constitutive elements of cyberspace that needs to be secured. We 
adopt the definition by Ottis and Lorents, who stated that “cyberspace 
is a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and 
 
46  European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace,” 7 February, 2013. 
47  SAM High Level Scientific Advisors, Scientific Opinion, no. 2/2017, Cybersecurity 
in the European Digital Single Market, 27 March 2017, p. 97. Online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/sam/pdf/sam_cybersecurity_report.pdf#view=fit&pag
emode=none. 
48  ENISA, “Definition of Cybersecurity – Gaps and overlaps in standardisation”, 
December 2015. Online at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-
cybersecurity. 
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human users that interact with these systems”.49 It is thus revealed that 
two elements of the system (cyberspace) are information systems and 
human users, and the properties of these elements are 
interconnectedness and interaction with information systems 
respectively. Cybersecurity laws can relate to either of these elements, 
i.e. addressing the state of information systems or conduct of human 
users. Norms expressed in regulatory instruments aim to influence 
these elements, by stating that “something ought to or may or must 
not be or be done”.50 
As to the first element, information systems, we can find that concepts 
of network- and information security and relating industry standards 
have already elaborated on how to approach the task of securing 
interconnected information systems (which necessarily include 
infrastructure, networks, data and information). 51  Cybersecurity 
professionals commonly refer to three security requirements, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, known as the “CIA Triad”52, 
which can relate not only to data and information in systems and 
networks, but also to systems and networks themselves.53  
As to the second element of cyberspace, the human user, however, it 
also becomes clear that the technically-oriented approach to 
cybersecurity, when nearly-equated with network and information 
security, might lose sight of a constitutive element of the system: the 
human user that interact with information systems.  
 
49  Ottis, R., Lorents, P., Cyberspace: Definition and Implications. In Proceedings of the 
5th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Dayton, OH, 
USA, 8/9 April, 2010. Reading: Academic Publishing Limited, pp. 267-270.  
50  G. H. v. Wright, Norm and Action, 1963. 
51  See a reference material for relevant standards in ENISA, Definition of 
Cybersecurity, Gaps and overlaps in standardization, 2015. Online at: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-cybersecurity. 
52  According to ISO/IEC 27000/2017. Confidentiality refers to a property that 
information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities 
or processes; Integrity is the property of accuracy and completeness; and Availability 
is the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.  
53  See also this approach in Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, Iowa Law 
Review, vol. 103: 985, 2018, pp. 985-1031. 
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Solms and Niekerk held that while information security refers to the 
human users’ role in the security process, in cybersecurity humans 
become targets or inadvertent participants of cyber-attacks, hence 
there are threats that fall outside the scope of information security.54 
Examples include cyber bullying, which does not (necessarily) 
constitute loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, 
systems or networks, but causes a direct harm to the person being 
bullied.55 Another case in point would be interference with automated 
home appliances, such as a security system, which can be remotely 
turned off in order to burgle the home, where again it can be argued 
that there is no impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information assets and system of the victim.56  Affected are other 
assets of the person. Accordingly, cybersecurity is more than the mere 
protection of networks and information systems, it also covers the 
protection of functions and assets that rely on or can be reached via 
cyberspace.57  
Therefore the process of cybersecurity should have aims and 
objectives that goes beyond the mere protection of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information, systems and networks 
themselves, and address the harms that may result as a consequence 
of degradation of functioning of computer systems, or due to 
interference with some interactions between information systems and 
their users. Yet, we should be more focused on aggregate interactions, 
from the perspective of the society. In the cyber-enabled society, 
where information’s importance is equivalent to that of money, 
energy, etc. and computerized systems are used to govern the society, 
in the center of focus are threats, risks, incidents, unlike in approaches 
 
54  Rossouw von Solms, Johan van Niekerk, From information security to cyber 
security, Computers & Security, 38, 2013, pp. 97-102. 
55  Ibid. 99. 
56  Ibid.  
57  Ibid. 102. 
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to information society, e-society or IT society etc.58 In other words 
the main point of concern for cybersecurity is the functioning of 
societies that - to any degree - depend on computerized systems to the 
extent that severe degradation in the functioning of these 
computerized systems can pose an existential threat to that society.59 
But interference with interactions between the society and 
computerized systems can also have similar impact.  
Examples can include the degradation of the functioning of the 
information systems in the financial sector as a whole, in a society, 
where 98% of all financial transactions are completed via electronic 
means. The consequences of such events in 2007 in Estonia were felt 
not only on the level of the individual financial institutions, such as 
the interruption of their operations and unavailability of internet 
banking interfaces for customers, etc. but it affected the financial 
sector as a whole. Similarly, the Wannacry attack bore significant 
influence on individual companies and institutions, but the scale of 
disruption also affected the normal existence of the society in the UK, 
80 out of 236 hospital trusts’ services were impacted, and 8% of 
General Practitioners practices felt victim to the attack.60  
However, degradation of the functioning of computer systems may 
not always be involved, where we can still detect interference with 
interactions between society and information systems, in particular 
taking into account the recent years technological developments in the 
field of artificial intelligence. For example in case using troll armies 
(automated, or potentially artificial intelligence based) in social media 
networks to polarize audiences on social and political issues, do not 
necessarily degrade the functioning of information systems and 
 
58  Lorents P., Ottis R., Rikk R., Cyber Society and Cooperative Cyber Defence, in: 
Aykin N. (eds) Internationalization, Design and Global Development, IDGD, 2009. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5623, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg. 
59  Ibid, p. 180. 
60  UK, NHS Report, “Lessons learned review of the WannaCry Ransomware Cyber 
Attack”, 2018. Online at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/02/lessons-learned-review-wannacry-ransomware-cyber-attack-cio-
review.pdf . 
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networks, but aims to influence the interactions between the systems 
and users. A recent media report in 2018 stated that Russian troll 
factories have been used to discredit life-saving vaccines.61 Shortly 
before this, the World Health Organization also published worrisome 
statistics indicating record high measle cases, including at least 37 
fatal infections in Europe in 2018, although vaccination provides 
effective protection against the disease.62 We are not able, nor have 
the intention to show a causal link between the troll’s action and the 
measles outbreak in this particular case, nevertheless it suggests the 
magnitude of impact of a potentially effective campaign by trolls to 
manipulate the population into self-harming behaviour, or as we see 
it interfering with the interactions between the society and 
computerized systems, without degrading the functioning of these 
systems. 
3.3 Towards a consequences-based approach to 
cybersecurity in the EU 
The EU’s cybersecurity efforts as a whole reflect a comprehensive 
understanding and approach, however it has been characterized by 
commentators as fragmented, and patchwork.63 The EU has recently 
reached a political agreement on the Cybersecurity Act that signifies 
a global landmark in cybersecurity legislation.64 Article 2 (1) of the 
(still) draft defines cybersecurity for the purposes of the regulation as 
“all activities necessary to protect network and information systems, 
 
61  Harry de Quetteville, “How Russian troll factories used Twitter to discredit life-
saving vaccines”, The Telegraph, 13.10.2018. Online at: https://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/0/inside-story-russian-troll-factories-using-twitter-discredit/. 
62  World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, “Measles cases hit record 
high in the European Region”, 20.08.2018. Online at: http://www.euro.who.int/en/ 
media-centre/sections/press-releases/2018/measles-cases-hit-record-high-in-the-
european-region. 
63  Maria Garzia Porcedda, “Patching the Pathchwork: appraising the EU regulatory 
framework on cybersecurity breaches”, Computer Law and Security Review, 34, 
2018, pp.1077-1098. 
64  European Commission, “EU negotiators agree on strengthening Europe’s 
cybersecurity”, 11.12.2018. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
news/cybersecurity-act-2018-dec-11_en. 
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their users, and affected persons from cyber threats”.65 This definition 
departs from the previous ones in a very significant way, since in 
addition to networks and information systems, it views the human 
user as the constitutive element of the system to be secured. It also 
implies a two-way of interaction 66  between human users and 
information systems, and it recognizes that information and 
interaction with information systems can influence events and human 
behaviour and society outside cyberspace. Therefore, the definition 
encompasses both the user’s effect on information systems and the 
information systems’ effects on users, however it would be plausible 
to think that the main concern is not about isolated cases.  
The Wannacry incident’s scale and immediate consequences resulted 
in significant disruption of a service as a whole in the healthcare 
system in the UK. Therefore, due to the reliance on computerized 
systems in the provisions of healthcare services the interaction 
between users and respective information systems was compromised 
– some due to infection by the Wannacry cyptoworm, but others due 
to turning off systems and devices as a precaution.67 In particular in 
the cases of turning off the systems as a precautionary measure in 
order to avoid infection, we can argue that the availability of 
information is not compromised (the computers and devices can be 
turned back on and usage may continue), yet the service that is 
underlied by these systems is hampered.  
In 2017 the Estonian ID card crisis also demonstrated that concern 
about potential authenticity and integrity breaches can lead to 
 
65  Interinstitutional File: 2017/0225(COD), Final version of the text on Proposal for 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the “EU 
Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on 
Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification 
(“Cybersecurity Act”). Online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ 
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_15786_2018_INIT&from=EN. 
66  Oxford dictionary defines interaction as reciprocal action or influence.  
67  National Audit Office, Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS, 25 April, 
2018. Online at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation 
-WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf. 
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significant disruptions in the delivery of e-services, although there are 
no reports about actual misuses.68 Also in this case the interaction 
between society and the Estonian information systems was 
significantly disrupted, raising additional questions about trust in the 
systems, although the integrity and authenticity of the services and 
data was not actually compromised, and systems could perform their 
functions just as before the discovery of the vulnerability. Again, as a 
precautionary measure Estonian authorities blocked digital 
certificates of 760 000 ID cards, and started to update those persons’ 
certificates first, who need their ID cards for their work, such as 
doctors, justice officials, civil servants, etc.69 The Estonian lessons 
learned show that a non-incident can create a significant crisis, 
comparable to that of an incident.  
The definition of cybersecurity in the draft Cybersecurity Act 
resonates with the service-oriented approach of Solms and Niekerk.70 
It covers technical and non-technical activities, however in the 
absence of a clear definition of cybersecurity it is difficult to devise 
legal tests for the purposes of determining precisely what activities 
would fall into the above category. While functions of and services 
that networks and information systems should perform can relatively 
easily be identified in technical terms, what can be considered as 
adverse effect on users and other persons is more challenging to 
identify given the endless ways cyberspace can be used. The analysis 
of the Wannacry case has already pointed towards some harms that 
may be considered, therefore protective measures and activities 
should address, inter alia, the potential and actual economic damages, 
decrease in productivity, reputational damages, decrease of trust in 
computer systems, destabilization of physical world, and potential 
losses in sovereignty. 
 
 
68  Tallinna Tehnikaülikool, ID-kaardi kaasuse õppetunnid, 2018. Online at: 
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/EID/id-kaardi_oppetunnid.pdf. 
69  Ibid.  
70  See 54. 
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We claim that what is to be secured by EU cybersecurity regulation 
are interconnected information systems, including data, information 
systems and networks, and aggregate interactions between human 
users and these information systems. In our view, what distinguishes 
network and information security regulation from cybersecurity 
regulation is that cybersecurity regulation aims to protect not only 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, information systems 
and networks71, but also certain interactions between these and the 
society involving two or more Member States.  
However, this line of thought and the proposed definition of 
cybersecurity by the EU Cybersecurity Act also opens a Pandora’s 
box. What exactly is considered as a threat that can affect information 
systems’ users and persons so that it becomes a concern for the EU? 
Which regulatory measures are best suited to address this issue? In 
which areas of cybersecurity management (i.e. prevention, detection, 
response, recovery) the EU is best placed to regulate? What oversight, 
supervision and enforcement measures ensure achievement of the 
objectives of the cybersecurity policy of the EU and respect the rule 
of law and fundamental human rights at the same time? The next part 
of this paper looks for some answers to these questions in the existing 
EU framework. 
4.  Cybersecurity laws 
General legal frameworks and challenges 
Gercke proposed a catalogue of “mandatory” and “optional” 
cybersecurity laws: the former category comprises of definitions, 
cybercrime laws and data protection legislation; while the latter 
optional areas include network and critical infrastructure protection, 
reporting obligations, international cooperation, electronic evidence, 
 
71  This is a simplified view from us in respect of security requirements that can also 
include authenticity, non-repudiation, accountability, reliability, etc. depending on 
the precise standard, context and needs.  
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electronic transactions, digital signatures, child online protection, 
liability of internet service providers and potential restrictions on the 
use of certain technology.72 
Gercke offered a comprehensive view on cybersecurity legal 
framework and also noted that cybersecurity was often conflated with 
cybercrime, however not all cybersecurity incidents are criminal 
acts.73 Wannacry used a known vulnerability for which Microsoft had 
issued a security patch in March 2017 for supported Windows 
versions74, and spread to devices that have not applied the update. Not 
applying this patch, or other similars, generally does not constitute a 
criminal act, but may give rise to disciplinary or negligence claims, 
or non-compliance with data protection regulations, etc. However, 
precisely the unpatched vulnerabilities in systems were exploited by 
the creators of the Wannacry cryptovirus, which can already be 
described in the terms of the Cybercrime Convention. Fight against 
and preventing cybercrime is but one component of cybersecurity.75  
Cybersecurity is still often seen as a purely technical or awareness 
problem, not a legal one. Available reports on the reactions and 
lessons learned from Wannacry did not address legal issues at the 
affected organizations’ level.76,77 Nevertheless, there are significant 
information gaps, often framed as problems in cybersecurity 
information sharing among private sector players, between private 
and public sector and between countries. These issues reach beyond 
 
72  Marco Gercke, Content of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Legal Framework, Cri, 
2/2014. 
73  Marco Gercke, Content of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Legal Framnework, Cri, 
2/2014, p. 34. 
74  See online at: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4013389/title. 
75  Marco Gercke, Content of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Legal Framework, Cri, 
2/2014, p. 34. 
76  See UK NHS Report, “Lessons learned review of the WannaCry Ransomware Cyber 
Attack”, 2018. Online at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
02/lessons-learned-review-wannacry-ransomware-cyber-attack-cio-review.pdf . 
77  See Deutsche Bahn Interim Report, January-June 2017. Online at: 
https://www1.deutschebahn.com/resource/blob/1047480/1f573efc5d5d1f119dba29
a882272eea/zb2017_dbkonzern_en-data.pdf. 
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technology, and concern exceptions in the data protection regulation, 
breach notification obligations of operators (private or public) and 
information exchange on potentially national security-related 
questions between EU Member States when collectively planning 
prevention, detecting, responding to or recovering from cyber 
incidents and events. 
In EU context it also needs to be clarified which issues fall within the 
competence of EU law and what aspects remain within the 
competence of Member States, how the two levels interact, respecting 
the main principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This involves 
mapping of cross-border interdependencies of cyber societies, since 
while an availability crisis can hit across sectors, the Estonian ID-card 
(chip vulnerability) crisis appears to be more contextual in the 
absence of pan-European information systems for the support of 
relevant societal functions.  
It would be expected that the EU’s primary concerns are rather the 
generic and strongly interlinked services, however local cybersecurity 
management should also remain a high priority. In the light of the 
EU’s own modest operational capabilities in this regard (such as 
ENISA still has only very limited resources and performs advisory, 
training and support functions, although there are plans to increase 
EU level capabilities78), the EU’s role in securing cyber societies will 
probably remain mainly complementary and supportive to that of 
Member States, including coordination, providing platforms for 
information exchange and cooperation, harmonization, mediating 
capacity building, research and development, etc. The more intensive 
role will be confined to areas, were the EU has exclusive competence 
or shares competences with Member States, most prominently 
concerning the Digital Single Market. In the following chapters we 
outline the main existing and proposed EU documents and legislation 
 
78  European Commission, “EU negotiators agree on strengthening Europe’s 
cybersecurity”, 11.12.2018. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/ 
cybersecurity-act-2018-dec-11_en. 
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pertaining to cybersecurity, analyze what harms they aim to address 
and how, and point out pertinent issues legislators would have to 
devote further scrutiny on.  
5.  Conceptual shifts in EU cybersecurity policy 
5.1  Initial place of cybersecurity concerns in EU legislation 
The EU has demonstrated intensifying legislative activity in the field 
of network and information security since the early 2000’s.79 It was 
emphasized from the beginning that “security is becoming a key 
priority because communication and information have become a key 
factor in economic and societal development” 80  and many of the 
currently binding EU laws have their non-binding predecessors from 
10-15 years ago addressed in the third pillar81 of the EU82.  
Generally the provisions dealing with security in networks and 
information systems in early EU regulations had two main 
considerations: protection of privacy and personal data 83 , and 
harmonizing requirements for the sake of completing the single 
 
79  The first instrument with specific focus on security was the Commission’s, 
26.1.2001, Communication (COM(2000) 890 final), ‘Creating a Safer Information 
Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating 
Computer-related Crime’.  
80  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 
Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach 
/COM/2001/0298 final/. 
81  From 1993 until 2009 in the EU’s ‘three pillar system’ the first pillar referred to 
economic, social and environmental policies; the second pillar stood for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy; and the third pillar consisted of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters. 
82  See for example in the field of fighting cybercrime Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, which 
was replaced by Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 August, 2013 on attacks against information systems. 
83  See for example Directive 97/66/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15.12.1997, concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the telecommunications sector. 
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market. However, the establishment of ENISA sparked a debate on 
the conceptual framework of network and information security in the 
EU, which was considered by the EU’s court,84 and it held that these 
measures also form “part of a normative context circumscribed by the 
Framework Directive and the specific directives and directed at 
completing the internal market in the area of electronic 
communications”. 85  Therefore it can be claimed that the EU’s 
primary concern was data security, and the broader network and 
information or cybersecurity aspects were rather incidental in special 
legal regimes86, having to do more with the completion of the internal 
market, than with the potential harms that can result from misuses or 
degradation of functioning of computer systems. These provisions set 
 
84  The legal basis for EU action in the ‘first pillar’ in the areas of network and 
information security has been addressed in case C-217/04 UK vs. EU Parliament and 
Council. More precisely, the establishment of ENISA by Reg. No 460/2004, its 
objectives and the tasks assigned to it by Regulation EC No. 460/2004 were regarded 
as measures for approximation in the meaning of Art. 114 of TFEU (ex Article 95 
TEC). 
85  C-217/04 United Kingdom vs. European Parliament and Council, paras. 59-60. 
86  Several legal provisions were listed in the judgment that “express concern of the 
Community legislature in relation to network and information security”. These 
included Article 8 (4) (c) and (f), framework dir. 2002/21/EC, which state the need 
for high level of protection of personal and privacy, as well for maintaining the 
integrity and security of public communications networks. The Authorization 
Directive 2002/20/EC briefly refers to security and personal data protection as part 
of those maximum conditions that may be attached to general authorization to 
provide electronic communication networks and services, and Article 23 of the 
Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC refers to integrity and availability of public 
telephone services, in particular emergency services in cases of catastrophic events. 
More detailed provisions can be found in the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC, which 
in Article 4 and 5 deals with network security and confidentiality of communications. 
Noteworthy in Article 4 that it requires service providers to take technical and 
organizational measures having regard to the state of the art, costs, appropriateness 
of measures and risks present, a language that reflect focus on prevention and will 
appear more prominently later and outside the narrow field of electronic 
communications. In addition to these, the Personal Data Protection Directive and the 
e-Signatures Directive also touched upon security issues within their specific 
contexts, in Article 17 and 3 (4) respectively. Certain other security aspects of digital 
assets, protection of intellectual property in the information society, are addressed by 
the EU’s specialized regulatory regimes on copyrights, patents, database protection, 
etc.  
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out some vague and overall requirements for information and network 
security, but their scope was limited to the telecommunication sector, 
personal data protection and e-signatures. Therefore many 
information society services as they emerged fall outside the scope of 
these laws, such as most cloud services, search engines, e-
marketplaces, internet telephony services, unless they were in the 
specific signal transmission business, which qualifies as electronic 
communications service for the purposes of the telecom regulations87, 
or processed personal data and relevant data protection rules 
(eventually) came into play88.  
However, the legislative landscape has significantly changed since 
the first elements of cybersecurity-related provisions were put in 
place and whereas network and information security used to be 
understood as merely complementary to the electronic 
communications field, today the picture is more complex, in 
particular that cybersecurity is a broader concept than network and 
information security. Virtually the entire legal framework has already 
been revised and updated, yet a significant EU reform in 
cybersecurity has just begun. Today there are numerous legal 
instruments of the EU having a bearing on cybersecurity and several 
proposals are pending. 
  
 
87  Article 2 (c) of the Framework Directive defines that "electronic communications 
service" means a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly 
or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, 
including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used 
for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does 
not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks. 
88  Although some provisions of the Personal Data Protection Directive needed 
clarifications by the courts, for example in the Google vs Spain case (Case C‑131/12), 
popularly known as addressing the ‘right to be forgotten’.   
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5.2  Cybersecurity becomes a priority 
In the context of the second pillar of common foreign and security 
policy the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia have led to a turning 
point, and cybersecurity was identified as a security issue in the report 
on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
submitted by SG/HR Javier Solana to the European Council in 
December 2008. 89  The term “cybersecurity” turned into a policy 
buzzword after the adoption of the EU’s 2013 Cybersecurity 
Strategy90 and cybersecurity is now an integral part of EU policies. 
The document addressed cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion 
and foresaw that proposed activities would operate within different 
legal frameworks, notably network and information security, law 
enforcement and defence, and on two levels, the national and EU 
level. 91  It established five priorities: achieving cyber resilience; 
drastically reducing cybercrime; developing cyber-defence policy and 
capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP); develop the industrial and technological resources for 
cybersecurity; and establish a coherent international cyberspace 
policy for the European Union and promote core EU values. The 2013 
strategy is centered mostly on the importance of cybersecurity for 
economic reasons, but also mentions some particular concerns, 
thereby implying what harms are considered: economic losses both in 
terms of damages and decreased productivity, decreased confidence 
of citizens to use e-services, physical and impalpable harms to 
citizens, and the loss of autonomy for citizens outside the EU.  
  
 
89  EEAS, “Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing 
Security in a Changing World”, 11.12.2018. Online at: https://europa.eu/ 
globalstrategy/en/report-implementation-european-security-strategy-providing-
security-changing-world. 
90  Joint Communication To The European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, 
JOIN/2013/01 final. 
91  Ibid. p. 17. 
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5.3  Raising the stakes: EU’s new cybersecurity strategy 
The overall strategy is currently formulated in the European 
Commission’s Joint communication on Resilience, Deterrence and 
Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU, which updated the 
2013 strategy document. 92  The new vision is moving from the 
comprehensive approach towards a more integrated one, where 
economic, political and strategic threats enjoy equal attention, and 
cybersecurity can be seen as a horizontal policy issue, or a common 
societal challenge, having elements in multiple layers of government, 
economy and society. Therefore, the updated strategy goes beyond 
the previously stated areas of network and information security, 
cybercrime, cyber defence and external relations, and proposes 
measures in product liability, consumer protection, labour market, 
financial services, education, trade and investment fields as well. 
Emphasis is on building resilience and deliver better EU response to 
cyber-attacks, signifying a shift from a reactive to a proactive 
approach.  
The threats outlined in the introduction part of the Communication 
imply that the EU is ready to address potential harms by different 
measures. The concern about negative economic impact of misuses 
and degradation in the functioning of computer systems is still central, 
however the issue has grown in magnitude and worries are expressed 
about potential economic destabilization, decreased political 
autonomy, disrespect for territorial integrity, physical harms, decrease 
in consumer trust and the decreased ability of states to provide order 
in the society by enforcing their laws.  
In the next section we identify legal measures that are either already 
available or are proposed and, if and when adopted, can be used in the 
future to address the potential and actual harms identified so far. 
 
 
92  JOIN (2017) 450. 
Towards Conceptualizing EU Cybersecurity Law 
29 
 
6.  EU Cybersceurity Laws 
6.1  Information society laws and cyber resilience 
6.1.1 Electronic Communications 
In 2009 several provisions requiring operators of electronic 
communications networks and services to implement security 
measures were incorporated into the EU’s Telecom regulatory 
framework. The “Better Regulation Directive“ established a regime 
for undertakings providing public communications networks or 
publicly available electronic communications services imposing 
requirements to implement risk-based security management practices, 
state-of-the-art technical and organizational measures, as well as to 
notify national authorities of a breach of security or loss of integrity 
incidents with significant impact.93  
The newly adopted European Electronic Communications Code 
(EECC) kept the underlying structure of the security regime, however 
now it clearly includes security of networks and services and end-user 
benefits94, whereas the EECC also extends to services that fall outside 
scope of the previous framework95, adds definitions of “security of 
networks and service” and “security inciden”, and clarifies a number 
of important points on the breach notification obligations, roles and 
powers of authorities and relevant institutions. This brings a 
significant expansion of the EU’s oversight on the electronic 
 
93  Articles 13a and 13b of Directive 2009/140/Ec Of The European Parliament And Of 
The Council of 25 November 2009, amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorization of electronic 
communications networks and services. 
94  Art. 1 (2) (a) of the EECC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, Establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, 
COM/2016/0590 final – 2016/0288 (COD). 
95  It was unclear whether i.e. if or to what extent internet telephony services or 
electronic processing services (for email service) fall under the regime. See for 
example Case C-142/18, Case C-193/18. 
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communications field, which will cover not only those service 
providers that operate the core communication infrastructures, but 
also those that built up new business models relying on the core 
infrastructures for the provision of their services, but not engaging in 
the “signal conveyance” business, hence did not fit the definition in 
Article 2 (c) of the Framework Directive96. The EECC redefines the 
meaning of “electronic communication service”, now expressly 
including internet access service, interpersonal communication 
services (both number-based and number independent ones), as well 
as traditional signal conveyance.97 This will result in higher-level 
security requirements imposed on a new layer of service providers in 
the field of communications in the EU, filling another gap in 
cybersecurity-related legislation. The EECC is to be implemented by 
the end of 2020. 
6.1.2  Electronic Signatures and Trust Services 
Significant piece of the cybersecurity puzzle lays with the eIDas 
Regulation98 that replaced the 1999 e-signatures directive. It is hard 
to overestimate the role of the eIDas Regulation, since it lays down 
the foundations for mutual recognition and assessment of electronic 
identification or eID means, and it also defines assurance levels, i.e. 
criteria for assigning a degree of confidence for claimed or asserted 
 
96  According to Directive 2002/21/EC, the Framework Directive, “electronic 
communications service” means a service normally provided for remuneration which 
consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in 
networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising 
editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks 
and services; it does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 
of Directive 98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of 
signals on electronic communications networks. 
97  Article 2 (4) of the EECC. 
98  Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July, 2014, on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions 
in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. 
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identity of persons by electronic identification means.99 The second 
part of the eIDAS Regulation details the conditions and requirements 
for providing various trust services.100 These trust services serve as 
points of reference for digital security, which include creation and 
verification of electronic signatures, website authentication, 
guaranteeing the origin and integrity of electronic seals, electronic 
time-stamps, etc. The Regulation establishes security requirements 
for trust service providers, referring to technical and organizational 
measures and risk-based approach101, as well as breach notification 
obligations similarly to the EECC and NIS Directive. Our societies 
need reliable authentication and e-identification just as much as 
anonymity in cyberspace. 
6.1.3 ISP liability 
The e-commerce directive provides another pillar in cybersecurity-
related legislation, more precisely it exempts intermediary service 
providers from liability for information transmitted, based on their 
neutral role102. Furthermore ISP’s are not obliged to monitor their 
services and seek for illegal activity therein. The limits of this 
framework have been elaborated on in a series of court cases103 and 
additional self-regulatory arrangements were established by 
concerned service providers in order to bridge the disconnect between 
illegal content online and enforcement mechanisms. However, the 
current regime is increasingly difficult to sustain, as these services can 
 
99  Chapter II of Regulation (Eu) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July, 2014, on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. 
100  Chapter III of the Regulation (Eu) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 July, 2014, on electronic identification and trust services for 
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. 
101 Article 19. 
102  Articles Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June, 2000, on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. 
103  See for example ECJ cases Google vs Louis Vuitton and the others Joined Cases C-
2366/08 and C-238/08; L’Oreal vs eBay Case C-324/09; Delfi vs Estonia at ECHR.  
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be abused by third parties and presence of illegal content online has 
serious consequences for users, potentially for societies.  
There is abundance of illegal material online, and media frequently 
reports on one or another ISP failing to remove such content.104 Illegal 
material can come in different forms and shapes, can range from 
copyright-infringing audiovisual media, hate-speech and information 
relating to terrorism, and child exploitative content. Recent EU 
legislation qualifies the liability exemption regime and 
accommodates the particularities of different illegal content online. 
Specific responses were designed in this respect, for example 
amending the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 105  and in 
Chapter XIa of setting forth rules particularly addressed to video-
sharing platform services to protect the public from harmful material 
online, practically imposing an obligation on these providers to apply 
proactive measures to identify illegal activity and content online, 
albeit also encouraging co- and self-regulation. In addition the 
Commission has issued a recommendation to support this policy.106 
However the EU is drawing some red-lines in this field, since clear-
cut rules were proposed in 2018 for cases when service providers have 
been informed about illegal activity, including the obligation of 
hosting service providers to remove terrorist content or disable access 
to it within one hour from receipt of a removal order issued by a 
competent authority. 107  These examples demonstrate the ongoing 
 
104  See for example BBC report on Facebook failing to remove child exploitation images 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39187929 or Business insider report on You 
tube’s slow reaction to notifications about illegal content  
https://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-purges-over-400-channels-millions-of-
videos-to-address-child-exploitation-concerns-2019-2. 
105 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
November, 2018, amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive) in view of changing market realities PE/33/2018/REV/1. 
106 Commission Recommendation of 1 March, 2018, on measures to effectively tackle 
illegal content online (C (2018) 1177 final). 
107  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online COM (2018) 640 final. 
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policy shift, where the liability exemptions of the neutral gatekeepers 
are curtailed – short of a better solution to address the proliferation of 
illegal online content. 
6.1.4 Consumer protection  
Generally the EU’s consumer protection framework does not address 
problems of cybersecurity in specific terms, however some sporadic 
provisions already require that certain products are constructed so as 
to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy of users and 
subscribers. Article 3 and 4 of the Radio Equipment Directive contain 
broad requirements for data security for connected consumer 
products, such as smart watches, connected toys 108 , drones, etc., 
however its operational range is still unclear. 109  Issues of basic 
encryption, software updates, weak or lack of authentication in 
connected consumer products, and product liability remain highly-
debated open questions despite initiatives in this field.110  
6.1.5 Payment Services 
Among the sectoral measures the Second Payment Services Directive 
(PSD2)111 should also be mentioned as contributing to building strong 
cybersecurity in Europe. In the PSD2 an additional element, strong 
customer authentication is emphasized 112 , besides the risk-based 
management and incident reporting obligations imposed on payment 
 
108 See for example a recent security alert for childrens’ smart watches. Online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers_safety/safety_products/rapex/alerts/?eve
nt=viewProduct&reference=A12/0157/19&lng=en. 
109 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the operation of the Radio Equipment Directive, 2014/53/EU, 
COM(2018), 740 final. 
110 See for example Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, and 
the Commission is also reviewing the Product Liability Directive (Directive 
85/374/EEC) 
111 Directive (Eu) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November, 2015, on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 
2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, 
and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC. 
112  Articles 97 and 98. 
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service providers. The European Banking Authority is currently 
working on a draft for regulatory technical standards on strong 
customer authentication and common and secure communication 
under Directive 2015/2366 (PSD2).113  
6.1.6  Personal Data Protection 
In several EU regulatory instruments preventive measures are 
dominant, paying less attention to incident response, recovery and 
business continuity aspects. The General Data Protection 
Regulation114 can be seen as a cybersecurity instrument, essentially 
aiming to prevent misuses of personal data by imposing heavy 
limitations on their processing in the first place. Additionally the 
GDPR dedicates Article 32-34 to security of personal data, setting 
forth technical requirements and a breach notification regime. In this 
context, the Police Directive115 applies a similar approach, prescribes 
security measures and notification obligations, however the scope is 
different 116  and it is complementary to the GDPR, within the 
competences of the EU. The above instruments, however say little 
about responding to security incidents and recovery from them. These 
aspects are apparently left for the particular organizations implicated 
and to standards to be applied.  
 
 
113 See online at: https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1761863/Final+draft+ RTS 
+on+SCA+and+CSC+under+PSD2+%28EBA-RTS-2017-02%29.pdf. 
114 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April, 
2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 
115  Directive (Eu) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April, 
2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision, 
2008/977/JHA. 
116  The Directive applies to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for 
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against 
and the prevention of threats to public security. 
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6.1.7  High Common Level Network and Information Security 
Slightly more concern is given to incident response in the EU’s first 
cybersecurity law, the Network and Information Security Directive117, 
which obliges Member States to adopt national strategies for network 
and information security, aims to establish appropriate structures for 
national level management and cooperation among these in the EU, 
as well as it imposes important security requirements for operators of 
essential services and digital service providers. Although the NIS 
Directive signifies an important effort for harmonization in the field 
of cybersecurity, its effects are expected to be far weaker than it was 
intended in the original proposal put forth by the Commission, since 
public sector information systems as well as a portion of providers of 
information society services have been excluded from its scope and 
cooperation measures, including information sharing mechanisms, 
were reduced to the very minimum based on voluntary action by 
member states.118  
This regulatory framework leaves the question of response and 
recovery aspects mainly open, however the European Commission 
has issued a Recommendation that serves as a blueprint for action in 
case of cyber incidents with EU-wide effects.119 This plan was tested 
during the Wannacry incident first time, with reportedly positive 
results120 and the case pointed out how important cooperation in the 
area of cybersecurity is. Yet cooperation in incident response is just 
one piece of the puzzle, as the ‘non-incident’ of the ROCA 
 
117  Directive (Eu) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July, 
2016, concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union. 
118  Compare the current NIS Directive to the Commission Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning measures to ensure a high 
common level of network and information security across the Union/* 
COM/2013/048 final – 2013/0027 (COD) *. 
119  Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September, 2017, on co-
ordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises, C/2017/6100. 
120 Online at: https://www.bna.com/wannacry-provided-first-n73014451505/. 
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vulnerability discovery caused a crisis situation in Estonia.121 The 
Estonian experience with the naturally constrained flow of research 
and scientific information also makes the case for the establishment 
of European level network in this area.122  
6.1.8 Cybersecurity Act 
However, the European plans are more ambitious and cybersecurity 
is elevated to a significant policy issue, which requires appropriate 
coordination and enforcement mechanisms. The Commission has 
proposed the Cybersecurity Act, establishing a permanent mandate 
for the EU Cybersecurity Agency and a framework for cybersecurity 
certification.123 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Cybersecurity 
Act mentions a number of policy areas, sectors and refers to legal acts, 
where the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (currently ENISA) will have 
assigned tasks.  
These include, naturally the policy area of network- and information 
security, but also sectors with “cybersecurity element”, such as 
 
121 In 2017 the discovery of a vulnerability in the chips used in the Estonian ID-card led 
to serious concerns about the security of the infrastructure underlying the Estonian 
digital state. Although no security breaches or misuses were identified, the case 
pointed out some shortcomings in preparedness and unknown societal dependencies 
on current technologies. To mention a few points, the concentration of critical 
competences into a small number of experts and the unexpected dependency of the 
public sector and critical infrastructures on the ID-card for the performance of their 
tasks were brought to light. For an overview see online at: 
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/roca-vulnerability-
and-eid-lessons-learned.pdf or the more detailed Estonian version online at: 
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/EID/id-kaardi_oppetunnid.pdf. 
122  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence 
Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres. A contribution from the 
European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September, 
2018, COM/2018/630 final. 
123  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, 
the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on 
Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification 
(“Cybersecurity Act”). 
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finance, transport, energy.124 It is also foreseen that the Agency will 
support policy and law in electronic communications, electronic 
identity and trust services. The Network and Information Security 
(NIS) Directive has already been expressly tied to ENISA, entrusting 
it the coordination of CyberEurope cycle of exercises with Member 
States, assisting the Member States and the Commission with 
expertise, advice, guidelines and facilitating the exchange of best 
practices. 125  ENISA also has significant role in assisting in the 
implementation of legal and regulatory requirements of network and 
information security arising from the NIS Directive or any other legal 
act,126 as well as it will report on the implementation of the EU legal 
framework. ENISA will be tasked to prepare a candidate European 
cybersecurity certification scheme. This process should result in 
establishing points of reference for the ‘’duty of care“ principle and 
lead to the application of ‘’security by design and default“ approach 
by producers of connected devices. 
6.2  EU legal acts and cyber deterrence and defence 
Since the adoption of the 2013 EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy the legal 
framework tackling cybercrime has improved across the EU, whereas 
the substantive part of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
was practically implemented via the “Botnet Directiv”. 127  The 
Directive does not address questions of self-defense and remedies for 
 
124 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, 
the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on 
Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification 
(“Cybersecurity Act”) COM(2017) 477 final, 13 September, 2017, p. 7. 
125 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July, 
2016, concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union. 
126 Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May, 2013, concerning the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004. 
127 Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August, 
2013, on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA. 
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victims. The Botnet Directive is also complemented by another 
directive on combating sexual abuse and exploitation of children and 
child pornography.128 Although there are still some open questions on 
implementation of the above Directives 129 , the procedural and 
cooperation aspects of fighting cybercrime proved to be more 
controversial.   
One of the major failures of EU legislators has been the Data 
Retention Directive130, which was cancelled by the European Court 
of Justice due to its disproportionate measures obliging service 
providers to collect data on electronic communications. Since 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crimes is rather 
difficult when electronic communications data is unavailable or 
erased, imposing data retention obligations in the electronic 
communications sector appeared a reasonable step. However, in the 
Digital Rights Ireland case the Court pronounced that  
“[a]s regards the necessity for the retention of data required by Directive 
2006/24, it must be held that the fight against serious crime, in particular 
against organised crime and terrorism, is indeed of the utmost importance 
in order to ensure public security and its effectiveness may depend to a 
great extent on the use of modern investigation techniques. However, 
such an objective of general interest, however fundamental it may be, 
does not, in itself, justify a retention measure such as that established by 
Directive 2006/24 being considered to be necessary for the purpose of 
that fight”.131 
 
128  Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA 
129 National transposition measures communicated by the Member States concerning:  
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 
2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA. Online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ 
EN/NIM/?uri=celex:32013L0040. 
130 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
131 Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and 
Others, para 51.  
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The judgement opened the door for EU-wide fragmentation of data 
retention regulations, some Member States keeping their relevant 
national rules, some cancelling them, which also led the European 
Court to provide further guidance in two consecutive cases addressing 
details of and conditions of data retention.132 However, pending the 
proposal for the e-Privacy Regulation and discussions on data 
retention ongoing in EU institutions, coupled with the strong 
requirements of the GDPR, which has already proven to be an 
obstacle for information sharing with entities outside the EU133, the 
fate of the EU’s data retention regime appears to be still uncertain. 
Yet, rules on collection of data in cyberspace for the purposes of 
investigations and evidence remained a central issue, including for the 
purposes of attributing cyber-attacks to perpetrators. Just after the 
adoption of the US CLOUD Act134, which confers jurisdiction on the 
US authorities to request data held overseas from US companies, the 
EU has came up with its e-Evidence proposals to create a European 
Production Order and a European Preservation Order135, including 
allegedly strong, but controversial safeguards136, as well as to oblige 
service providers to designate a legal representative in the Union for 
the purposes of the legislation. In addition, the Commission has 
presented further proposals, including one addressing fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payments, extending the scope 
 
132 Joined Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, Tele2 Sverige and Case C‑207/16 Ministerio 
Fiscal . 
133 See for example European Data Protection Board, Letter to ICANN, 05 July, 2018. 
Online at: https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2018/letter-icann_en. 
134 US, Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act. Online at: https:// 
docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20180319/BILLS-115SAHR1625-RCP115-
66.pdf#page=2201. 
135  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal 
matters COM/2018/225 final – 2018/0108 (COD). 
136  For example Article 9 (5) of the proposal allows that private entities assess 
compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
object to cooperation on this ground.  
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of measures to virtual currencies. 137  The 2017 EU cybersecurity 
strategy addresses the question of deterrence as a mainly technical and 
capability issue, focussing on attribution, IPv6, forensic procedures 
and investigative capabilities of Member States’ law enforcement 
authorities. In a recent initiative, the four EU cybersecurity 
organisations, ENISA, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the 
European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and the Computer Emergency 
Response Team for the EU Institutions, Agencies and Bodies (CERT-
EU) also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a view to 
fostering cooperation and facilitating information exchange between 
the agencies.138 In addition private-public cooperation is emphasized, 
but this overflows to the section dealing with cyber defence and 
external dimensions of cybersecurity – not without a point, since 
several global cases have already demonstrated the importance of 
cooperation between the private and public sectors.139  
This leads us to the sphere of the EU, where coherence and common 
action is yet scarce: defence and international relations, the Common 
Security and Defence Policy. However, the EU has made significant 
steps in these areas approving the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox 140 , 
putting forward technology control proposals141 and concerns for the 
 
137  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating 
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2001/413/JHACOM/2017/0489 final – 2017/0226 (COD). 
138  General Secretariat of the Council, EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale 
Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises - Council conclusions, 100086/18, 26 June, 2018, 
at 3.  
139 One of the first global cases include the spread of the Conficker worm, where the 
counter-action and clean-up initiatives were mainly rooted in the private sector.  
140  Council of the European Union, “Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”, 07 July, 2017, 
7923/2/17 REV 2. Online at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
9916-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 
141 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, 
brokering, technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast),” COM (2016) 
616 final, September 28, 2016. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=1&year=2016&number=616&versio
n=ALL&language=en. 
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origins of foreign direct investments 142 . Cybersecurity is also 
overlapping with other policy areas, such as countering hybrid 
threats143or development policy144. Although the EU has initiated 
cooperation and is engaged with international actors in discussing 
cybersecurity, significant legal measures currently adopted in this 
area are few.145  
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has outlined some of the main cybersecurity legal 
challenges the EU is facing nowadays. Cybersecurity is an issue that 
will remain in the focus of the Member States and the EU, it will not 
be solved or go away miraculously. Yet, looking around ourselves, as 
users, members of organizations, people entrusted with carrying out 
societal functions, we should notice that we indeed depend on 
computer systems, which are not perfect and will never be. Yet, this 
dependency and inherent insecurity can be handled and managed, 
including by using legal tools, since cyberspace is human-created 
environment and serves human needs. 
We reasoned that EU cybersecurity laws aims to protect not only 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, information systems 
and networks, but also certain interactions with these by the society. 
Although it is somewhat unclear what types of harms EU laws aim to 
prevent, hence it is difficult to assess what interactions should be in 
 
142  European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments 
into the European Union,” COM (2017), 487 final, September 13, 2017. Online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-487-F1-EN-
MAIN-PART-1.PDF  
143 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Joint Framework 
on countering hybrid threats a European Union response JOIN/2016/018 final. 
144 SWD (2017) 157 final, Commission Staff Working Document, Digital 4 Develop-
ment: mainstreaming digital technologies and services into EU Development Policy. 
145 Rehrl, Jochen, European Security and Defense College, Federal Ministry of Defence 
of the Republic of Austria, “Handbook on Cyber Security”, 2018. Online at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/63138617-f133-
11e8-9982-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-81357173. 
Agnes Kasper / Alexander Antonov  
42 
 
focus, we were able to observe that the policy framework developed 
from a protecting business interests and personal data to a more 
inclusive one eventually being concerned with harms to economic 
interests, individuals and national security. The potential harms 
include direct economic losses, decreased productivity, reputational 
damage, decreased consumer trust, physical and impalpable harm to 
citizens, but also economic destabilization, decreased ability to 
provide order in the society, decreased political autonomy, and losses 
in sovereignty.  
Binding and stringent EU cybersecurity-related laws concern those 
private infrastructures that are at the core for the operation of 
cyberspace, in the electronic communications sector, as well as those 
that support the delivery of essential services for the society. Specific, 
cross-sectoral regulations regarding personal data protection also 
contribute to achieve cybersecurity aims in the EU and illegal or 
harmful content enjoys increasing attention from the EU regulators, 
generally raising the stakes for actors in the private sector in terms of 
liability. However, there are certain gaps and while implementation 
of security measures in the context of personal data processing 
extends to both private and public sectors, there are no EU level 
requirements to implement high-level network and information 
security measures in public administrations and for businesses other 
than the few listed in the NIS Directive. Social networks, app-stores, 
and most SME’s, unless they are involved with the supply chain for 
those covered by the NIS Directive, fall outside the scope of the 
Directive. The EU also applies regulations that are coercive in nature 
in countering cybercrime as well as for establishing organizational 
structures in this field.  
We can see from the regulatory choices that the EU does not impose 
strong authentication requirements easy-handedly and opts for 
alternative solutions, ultimately favouring user anonymity in other 
fields than payment services. The authors are inclined to attribute this 
choice to the fact that the functioning of the European society, as such, 
is less reliant on computerized systems for it basic functions, and it is 
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rather some individual Member States and certain sectors146 where 
deep dependencies exist, which can justify the dominantly soft touch 
approach from EU level. Although strong authentication in general 
would presumably contribute to building trust in e-services, by 
making the case for misuse harder (one can just imagine the impact 
of strong authentication for the use of social networks, for example), 
this neither would solve all the problems nor markets seem to be ready 
for such steps.  
Soft and collaborative instruments, voluntary and alternative 
measures are chosen by the EU for supporting and facilitating 
cooperation and information exchange among Member States. 
However, some hard law instruments are used when it comes to 
information flowing from private sector to public authorities, i.e. 
incident reporting obligations. These obligations do not extend to 
“non-incident”, such as vulnerability discovery and disclosure, which 
are targeted by standardization efforts in the EU. Soft measures are 
applied for EU level coordination of responses in crisis situations, 
including large-scale cyber-attacks.  
In the last few years the EU has made a great deal of progress in 
switching gears and moving from the reactive policy towards 
preventive and proactive approach in cybersecurity. In particular the 
adoption of the NIS Directive reflects this forward-looking nature of 
EU cybersecurity laws, which now oblige a range of actors to actually 
implement security measures, and do not leave room for alternative 
market-driven solutions (such as raising the prices of services/goods 
to compensate for the risks, or seeking insurance coverage, etc).  
However, there is little EU level guidance on private sector responses 
to cyber incidents, and recovery and business continuity aspects. The 
preventive approach is also visible in EU efforts to channel industry 
towards the adoption of “security by desig” practices and elaborating 
the content of “duty of car” principle. Yet, this way of thinking is not 
clearly identifiable when looking at the public sector and cooperation 
 
146  Such as the financial sector and Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
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among Member States. EU legal instruments dealing with Member 
States’ own and common effort to address cybersecurity challenges 
remain dominantly backward-looking, focusing on coordination of 
crisis response, imposition of criminal penalties, as well as political 
responses to cyber-attacks.  
Although most of the challenges are global, the EU appears to be 
internally focusing, emphasizing technological solutions. The EU’s 
approach to cybersecurity is centered on technological solutions for a 
good reason, however more attention should be paid to social and 
human aspects, as well as to higher level commitment to common 
standards and joint action, in particular collective preventive action, 
keeping in mind the potential harms that cybersecurity laws should 
address. 
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